

Message Text

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SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS CONSULTATIONS- SUMMARY
AND ANALYSIS OF MEETINGS TO DATE

MESSAGE NUMBER NINE

1. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF THE
MEETINGS ON NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS PRIOR TO RECESS OF
THESE TALKS ON NOVEMBER 5, 1974.

2. THE US HAS PRESENTED ITS AIDE MEMOIRE PROPOSING
A SMALL CONFERENCE OF KEY EXPORTERS AND SUGGESTING
FIVE TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION. WE HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY
ELABORATED ON THESE ISSUES AND RESPONDED TO SOVIET
REQUESTS FOR CLARIFICATION ON THE FOLLOWING THREE
ISSUES:

(1) DETAILS OF CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION,
TIMING, ETC. -- WE RESPONDED THAT THESE WOULD BE
DETERMINED IN FOLLOW-UP CONSULTATIONS WITH THE
SOVIETS AND THE OTHER KEY SUPPLIERS.

(2) DETAILS OF PLUTONIUM BUY-BACK PROVISIONS IN
PROPOSED REACTOR SALE TO EGYPT AND ISRAEL--WE RESPONDED
THAT IF OTHER KEY EXPORTERS WHO ARE NNWS BUY-BACK SUCH
PLUTONIUM IT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE SAME SAFUEGUARDS
AND CONTROLS ASSOCIATED WITH PLUTONIUM INDIGENOUSLY
PRODUCED IN THESE NNWS AND THAT WE ANTICIPATE THAT
ALL THE KEY EXPORTERS WILL HAVE NON-PROLIFERATION AND

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SAFEGUARDS COMMITMENTS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

(3) THE QUESTION OF WHETHER WE PROPOSE TO REQUIRE NPT ADHERENCE AS A CONDITION FOR EXPORT TO RECIPIENT NNWS--WE RESPONDED THAT SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE PRODUCTIVE AT THIS TIME SINCE SEVERAL KEY EXPORTERS ARE NOT NPT PARTIES, BUT THAT WE HOPED, AT A MINIMUM, TO DEVELOP AGREED CONTROLS THAT WOULD REQUIRE ACCEPTANCE BY THE RECIPIENT NNWS OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON ALL ITS NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND FACILITIES AND A NON-PROLIFERATION COMMITMENT COMPARABLE TO THE NPT, IN PARTICULAR ARTICLE II OF THAT TREATY.

3. THE SOVIET AIDE MEMOIRE ESSENTIALLY COVERED THE POINTS IN OUR PAPER AND RAISED SEVERAL OTHER ISSUES AS WELL THAT WERE CONCERNED WITH BROADER ASPECTS OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION PROBLEM SUCH AS STRENGTHENING THE NPT, IMPLEMENTING ITS ARTICLE III.2, STRENGTHENING THE IAEA, AND LATER, THEY PROPOSED UNDERTAKING JOINT DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO PRESSURE KEY NNWS INTO SIGNING AND RATIFYING THE NPT. THEY STRESSED THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO THE PROLIFERATION PROBLEM AND STATED REPEATEDLY THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO DISCUSS ONE ASPECT OF IT SUCH AS OUR PROPOSED EXPORTERS CONFERENCE WITHOUT CONSIDERING IT IN THE CONTEXT OF A FULL DISCUSSION OF NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES.

4. ONE FREQUENT EXAMPLE THAT THE SOVIETS USED WAS THAT ANY CONTROLS AGREED UPON BY THE KEY EXPORTERS WOULD HAVE TO BE VERIFIED BY THE IAEA AND THAT UNLESS THE UNSATISFACTORY CONDITIONS IN THE IAEA WERE CORRECTED, SUCH EFFORTS WOULD BE FUTILE. CONDITIONS AT THE IAEA ARE EVIDENTLY VERY DISTURBING TO THE SOVIETS AND THEY DO NOT FEEL THAT THESE PROBLEMS CAN BE RESOLVED ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS WITHOUT FIRST REACHING A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING WITH THE US ON HOW TO PROCEED. IN THIS CONNECTION, THEY SUGGESTED EIGHT MEASURES FOR STRENGTHENING THE IAEA (REPORTED IN MOSCOW 16863).

5. WE HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED DURING THESE CONSULTATIONS
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WITH THE APPARENT DEPTH OF THE SOVIET CONCERN ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION PROBLEM AND WITH THE INTENSITY OF THEIR DESIRE FOR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON A COMPREHENSIVE NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY. THEY APPEAR TO ENVISAGE PERIODIC BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON A REGULAR BASIS PERHAPS AT THE STOESEL-MOROKHOV LEVEL. IN THEIR VIEW, THESE CONSULTATIONS MIGHT OCCASIONALLY INCLUDE THE UK AND WHEN SPECIFIC INITIATIVES ARE IDENTIFIED, THEY COULD

BE DISCUSSED ON AN APPROPRIATE MULTILATERAL BASIS.

6. THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT, HOWEVER, INSISTED UPON BROAD NON-PROLIFERATION BILATERALS AS A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR OUR PROPOSED EXPORTERS CONFERENCE. IN ADDITION, THEY HAVE NOT OBJECTED TO OUR PROPOSED PARTICIPANTS OR AGENDA ISSUES, NOR HAVE THEY ARGUED THAT THEIR ALLIES SHOULD PARTICIPATE. WHILE THEY HAVE NOT AS YET FORMALLY ACCEPTED OUR PROPOSAL, MOROKHOV HAS INDICATED THAT HIS PERSONAL OPINION AND THAT OF HIS COLLEAGUES IS POSITIVE. HE THOUGHT A FORMAL DECISION WOULD TAKE AT LEAST A WEEK. STOESSEL INDICATED THAT HE WOULD BE AVAILABLE DURING THE RECESS FOR PRIVATE DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE AND THE TTBP/PNE TALKS AS WELL.

7. SOVIETS UNDOUBTEDLY WILL BE INTERESTED IN REACTIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES WE HAVE APPROACHED RE CONFERENCE, AND THEIR DECISION MAY TO SOME EXTENT BE DEPENDENT ON SUCH REACTIONS. MOROKHOV INDICATED TO AMBASSADOR ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS PARTICULAR INTEREST IN FRENCH ATTITUDES. ANYTHING WE CAN PASS ON TO SOVIETS ABOUT REACTIONS OF OTHER WILL BE APPRECIATED BY THEM AND MAY HELP THEM IN DECIDING THEIR OWN COURSE.
STOESSEL

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